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There are few provocative book titles as In Defence of 
War, yet, misleadingly perhaps, this is not a book about 
the defence of war per se but the just conditions under 
which war may or may not be perpetrated. Nigel Big-
gar’s monograph thus fits neatly into the canon of 
books on just war theory. The title In Defence of “Just” 
War would be nearer to Biggar’s scholarly contribution. 
The book is divided into three main arguments. First, 
Biggar refutes Christian pacifism and the assumption 
that Christian thought and dogma (in the form of the 
New Testament) is necessarily pacifist. Second, he sets 
out, or rather restates, the criteria of the just war tradi-
tion. Finally, and most controversially, he applies these 
criteria to the U.S.-led intervention of Iraq in 2003 and 
asks whether that war was just or not: he believes it 
was. Each of these arguments is elegantly and astutely 
argued with philosophical dexterity, and, whatever is 
ultimately made of his arguments, this is a well argued 
and worthy read.  
What is Biggar’s departure point? First, he is keen 
to stress that he writes the book as theologian and not 
as a diplomat, soldier or political scientist (p. 331). In 
this vein, he draws on a range of just war theorists 
reaching back through Grotius to Augustine and he ar-
gues that a just war is basically a punitive response to 
grave injustice (p. 212). Accordingly, while Biggar 
acknowledges the horrors and evil that can be un-
leashed by war, he takes strong exception with those 
Christian pacifists that argue that war must be avoided 
at all costs. As a theologian, and based on an Augustin-
ian reading of human nature, which recognises human-
ity’s aptitude for both good and evil, Biggar argues that 
sometimes war must be fought as a way to redress in-
justice. Not all wars, he stresses, can be avoided and in-
justice must be punished (p. 10). 
In this regard, one of the most compelling argu-
ments made by Biggar is that Christian pacifists such as 
Stanley Hauerwas, John Howard Yoder and Richard 
Hays do not recognise that peace, like war, can also be 
a great evil if it lets injustice prevail (pp. 7, 33). Where-
as Reinhold Niebuhr was critical of Christian pacifists 
too, although he acknowledged that they may play a 
role in stopping states from going to war without scru-
ples and ethics (see p. 31 of Christianity and Power Pol-
itics), Biggar is less forgiving of his theological brethren. 
He almost seems to mock Hauerwas, Yoder and Hays 
for placing too much faith in the idea that, because Je-
sus seemingly rejected violence in all its forms, so must 
Christians.  
It is on this point that Biggar engages in a debate 
about how one interprets the New Testament. For the 
secular reader this is perhaps the weakest part of the 
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book. While the chapter is central to Christian debates 
about war and peace, and it certainly helps the reader 
contrast Biggar’s views with those of his fellow theolo-
gians, in places the chapter reads as a superfluous ex-
ercise in hierographology. Biggar himself acknowledges 
that the Bible can hold many meanings and a close 
reading of the text will lead to different interpretations 
(see p. 18). It is, therefore, bemusing to see Biggar en-
gage in this type of interpretive debate (see p. 25) 
when to most readers it will seem obvious that seeking 
guidance for matters of war and peace on the basis of 
a text written many centuries ago is problematic, to say 
the least. For those readers with a background in Inter-
national Relations, it may have been more interesting to 
see Biggar use his opening chapter to substantially en-
gage with the thoughts of Niebuhr, especially given that 
Biggar does not share all of Niebuhr’s ideas (p. 11). Be-
yond an analysis of Moral Man and Immoral Society 
(1960) and An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (1979), 
Biggar does not engage with Niebuhr’s earlier thinking as 
set down in Christianity and Power Politics (1940) or 
Christian Realism and Political Problems (1953). 
Yet there are elements of this debate that should 
nonetheless be illuminating to the secular reader. First, 
Biggar does a splendid job of placing the just war tradi-
tion in its proper historical context. For example, he 
picks apart David Rodin’s argument that the just war 
tradition is theoretically flawed because it is based on 
notions of national defence and sovereignty. This 
claim, Biggar contends, is only possible because Rodin 
looks at the just war tradition from the late modern 
period onwards, when, in fact, if one looks at the early 
modern period, one will see that the main concern for 
just war thinkers was injustice and not the defence of 
the nation-state. Biggar expertly makes his case by 
looking at the thoughts of a wide-range of thinkers 
from Aquinas through to de Vitoria and Suarez and 
then Grotius. Biggar shows how the just war tradition 
has a long history, although he could have made more 
of the way in which the arguments made under the 
tradition have altered over the course of history. In-
deed, the fact that Rodin was able to reach one conclu-
sion about the just war tradition and Biggar reaches 
quite another relates back to the problem of interpre-
tation. This is not even to speak, as Richard Tuck has so 
excellently demonstrated, about how just war thinking 
even predates Christianity (see his The Rights of War 
and Peace: Political Thought and the International Or-
der from Grotius to Kant (2002)). 
Nevertheless, all of this should not take away from 
the manner in which Biggar superbly refutes Christian 
pacifism’s claim that all war is immoral, evil and should 
be avoided at all costs. Once Biggar has extricated him-
self from the hierographical debate in chapter one, he 
builds a rather moving case that reaches beyond the 
ethical generalisations often forwarded by the Chris-
tian pacifists. He does this by looking at the real-life 
experiences of those who fought in wars such as the 
Great War and Kosovo, and Biggar’s ability to bring to 
life the ethical experiences of soldiers in these wars is 
truly commendable. The chapter “Love in War” shows 
how soldiers and military planners deal with resent-
ment, compassion, forgiveness, repentance, injustice, 
proportionality and retribution during war. Far from 
casting war as a completely immoral act, Biggar’s nu-
anced interpretation of the morality of war helps us 
question the simplistic dichotomy of “peace = good” 
and “war = evil” forwarded by the Christian pacifists. 
On what grounds then might one criticise Biggar’s 
arguments? One might take exception with the rigidity 
that comes from thinking that just war is merely about 
punishing gross injustices. Biggar is at pains to say that 
justice is central to the perpetration of a just war, but 
he does not sufficiently pay attention to the historical 
context in which justice is framed. While it is true that 
Biggar recognises that war will be judged differently as 
history develops (p. 305), he still gives one the impres-
sion that justice is fixed through time, when, although 
this may or may not be the case, surely the nature of 
those perpetrating gross injustice colours the extent to 
which states are willing to fight wars. For example, Big-
gar makes the case that Nazism and Saddam Hussein’s 
tyrannical regime, while different in their aims and ex-
tremes, should still answer to a fixed understanding of 
injustice and it is this understanding, rather than the 
different dangers posed by these regimes, which 
should condition our recourse to war. This is surely to 
misunderstand the motivations of states when they do 
decide to go to war. Nazism was a clear and present 
danger to the allies (bombs were being dropped on 
London), whereas Saddam’s regime posed a different 
sort of danger to the world. The degree of threat is as 
much a part of the calculations of states, and so it is 
not inconceivable that this will play a role in how one 
decides whether war is just or not. Similarly, the poten-
tial level of destruction of any given war must fit in 
with our understanding of justice. The threat of mutu-
ally assured destruction would certainly play a crucial 
role in whether one punishes injustice or not. 
Justice is necessarily bound up with such considera-
tions. Biggar even acknowledges this when he remarks 
that the “legal case [for war] is bound to involve moral 
elements. Morality and legality are not separable” (p. 
248). Yet, if one accepts the implications of an interna-
tional system comprised of states, notions of justice, 
legality and morality must also stand alongside ques-
tions of international politics and military strategy. 
Surely this is the reason why the US could invade Iraq, 
but it will not do so in North Korea? Furthermore, even 
if war is initially based on justice it can lead to conse-
quences that are far from just: conducting war is not 
like police work. As Biggar himself acknowledges, ‘once 
we relax the leash on the dogs of war, we should ex-
pect to be dragged where we do not want to go. Long 
 Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 2, Pages 51-53 53 
experience has taught that war has a momentum of its 
own—partly military, partly political—that is not readi-
ly controlled’ (pp. 252-253). Nevertheless, Biggar ar-
gues that because states can never truly know the con-
sequences of unleashing the dogs of war, this should 
not stop them from using force to punish gross injus-
tice. For example, with the benefit of hindsight he 
openly acknowledges the tragic consequences of the 
second Iraq war, but he still holds that the initial ra-
tionale for war of punishing Saddam and his regime for 
the injustices they caused was just. 
Indeed, Biggar’s central argument about just war 
hinges on the reader’s acceptance of the importance of 
justice. This causes a rather particular problem. While 
Biggar is not a cosmopolitan thinker in the traditional 
sense—he does not, for example, believe that global 
government is possible (see pp. 241-242)—, his em-
phasis on justice has a distinctly cosmopolitan appeal. 
He is right to distance himself from thinkers such as 
Hauerwas, who believed that the nation-state is sinful 
(pp. 21-22), but the fact that states exist and will follow 
their own interests still poses a problem for the retri-
bution of injustice. In Christianity, Diplomacy and War 
(1953), Herbert Butterfield points to this problem 
when he argues that the state and secular humanism 
had done away with any notion of worldly justice. In 
the context of Biggar’s book, this leads one to ask 
whether justice can really ever take on true meaning 
without it in some sense having a universal appeal. 
Justice is but one of the factors guiding war. While 
one can reasonably agree with Biggar that one cannot 
fully predict the likely consequences of armed inter-
vention, states must consider the fact that the fog cast 
over one’s ability to predict is in itself reason to exer-
cise caution before committing to war. That is, the 
“unknown unknowns” of any situation should play a 
critical role in the decision to go to war. States may and 
do act out of a sense of justice but it is only one part of 
their overall calculation. Iraq may or may not have had 
just cause under Biggar’s formulation, but those Amer-
ican voices that argued for caution and restraint were 
thinking about the longer term. We now know that the 
Iraq war was damaging not just to the US’ reputation, 
but also to its willingness to fight wars in the future. 
Barack Obama’s election to the presidency was partly 
about ending America’s wars, and this has articulated 
to some degree the public’s hesitancy for the US’ role 
as the world’s policeman. Paradoxically, intervening in 
Iraq may have dented America’s appetite to fight even 
greater injustices in the future. 
Biggar has written a thought-provoking book that is 
very timely given the four-year commemoration of the 
First World War and the ongoing debate about the 
second Iraq war. He has a forensic eye for detail and 
argues persuasively, yet, given the emotions that are 
triggered during any debate on war, this book will, as 
any good book should, divide opinion.  
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